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Identification Protocols in Cryptography
Michael O’Donnell
School of Informatics and Engineering, ITB Blanchardstown, Dublin, Ireland

Abstract
In this paper we examine the role of Identification Protocols in the field of Cryptography.
Firstly, the rationale behind the need for Identification Protocols is discussed. Secondly, we
examine, in detail, challenge-response protocols, based upon zero-knowledge proofs, that
form a subset of Identification Protocols in general. Thirdly, the mathematical tools
necessary for the understanding of how these protocols work is given. Finally, we discuss
four main Identification Protocols: Fiat-Shamir, Feige-Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr and GuillouQuisquater. This discussion includes the theory, practical examples and the security aspects
of each protocol.

1. Introduction
“If you think cryptography is the answer to your problem, then you don't know what your
problem is.”
Peter G. Neumann
Quoted in the New York Times

[12]

At the moment there are a plethora of terms, definitions and even some disagreement about
what

constitutes

message

authentication,

data

origin

authentication,

transaction

authentication, key authentication and entity authentication or identification.
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For consistency and clarity, we will use the definitions as outlined in the “Handbook of
Applied Cryptography” by Menezes et al. [1]

2. Authentication Methods
Authentication is any process by which an entity (which could be a person or indeed another
computer) establishes its identity to another entity. Authentication can generally be divided
into two main areas:
1. Entity authentication or identification
2. Data-origin authentication
Authentication in the broadest sense encompasses not only these two areas, but also
protection from all active attacks. Active attacks involve some modification of the
communication between source and destination or indeed the substitution of an authentic
communication by another communication entirely. This contrasts with encryption, which
only provides protection from passive attacks. Passive attacks involve eavesdropping or
monitoring of a communication between source and destination. [2]

2.1 Data origin authentication (message authentication)
Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is corroborated as being
the original source of specified data created at some (typically unspecified) time in the past.
By definition, data origin authentication includes data integrity - which guarantees that data
has not been altered in an unauthorised manner since the time it was created, transmitted or
stored by an authorised source.
Message authentication is a term that is similar to data origin authentication. It provides data
origin authentication and data integrity but does not provide uniqueness or timeliness.
Uniqueness guarantees that the source of the data can be identified with an established degree
of confidence and that the source we are dealing with is who they purport to be. Timeliness
guarantees that the data was sent by the source at a time which can be verified by both the
source and destination.
Two common methods of providing message authentication include:
1. Message authentication codes (MACs)
2. Digital signature schemes
May 2002
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While MACs and digital signature schemes may be used to establish that a specified party
generated data at some time in the past, they establish no uniqueness or timeliness
guarantees. These methods alone cannot detect for example message replay (where a
message is passively captured and is subsequently retransmitted to produce an unauthorised
effect).
2.2 Transaction authentication
Transaction authentication not only provides message authentication but also uniqueness and
timeliness of data, thus preventing undetectable message replay. The uniqueness and
timeliness guarantees are provided by random numbers in challenge-response protocols,
sequence numbers and timestamps. [1]
A typical scenario, involving the use of challenge-response protocols in a private-key
cryptosystem such as DES (Data Encryption Standard), consists of the following three steps:
[3]
1. Bob chooses a challenge, x, which is a random 64-bit string. Bob sends x to
Alice.
2. Alice computes

y = E k (x)
and sends it to Bob.
3. Bob computes

y ' = E k ( x)
and verifies that

y' = y
2.3 Entity authentication (identification)
Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured of the identity of a second
party involved in a protocol and that the second party has actually participated in the
execution of that protocol. These protocols, which are more commonly known as
identification protocols, use asymmetric techniques, but do not rely on digital signatures or
public-key encryption. Neither do they use sequence numbers or timestamps. Instead they use
random numbers, both as a challenge and a commitment, based upon interactive proof
systems and zero-knowledge proofs. [1]. Challenge-response protocols based upon zeroknowledge proofs are the main topic of investigation in this paper.
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2.4 Key authentication
Key authentication is the property whereby one party is assured that no other party aside
from a specifically identified second party (and possibly additional identified trusted parties)
may gain access to a particular secret key. This requires both the secrecy of the key and
identification of those parties with access to it. The identification requirement here differs in
one very important respect from that of entity authentication outlined above. Here the
requirement is knowledge of the identity of parties that may gain access to the key, rather
than corroboration that actual communication has been established with such parties.
Kerberos is a key transport protocol that is based on symmetric techniques. In symmetric
techniques, the same key is shared between the two parties, Alice and Bob, with the proviso
that the key is kept secret from an adversary such as Oscar. It may, however, be shared with a
trusted third party or a key distribution centre (KDC). Kerberos is an example of a challengeresponse scheme providing both entity authentication and key establishment based on
symmetric encryption.
Public-key techniques may also be used for challenge-response based identification
providing both entity authentication and key establishment.
The table summarises the properties already defined.

Property
Type of
authentication
Message authentication
Transaction authentication
Entity authentication
Key authentication

Identification
of source

Data integrity

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
---Yes

Timeliness or
Uniqueness
---Yes
Yes
Desirable

3. Identification Objectives
Identification is the process through which one ascertains the identity of another person or
entity. In our daily lives, we identify family members, friends and coworkers by their
physical properties, such as voice, face or other characteristics. These characteristics, called
biometrics, can be used on computer networks with special hardware. Entities on a network
may also identify one another using cryptographic methods. An identification scheme (or
May 2002
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protocol) allows Alice to identify herself to Bob in such a way that someone listening in
cannot pose as Alice later. One example of an identification scheme is a zero-knowledge
(identification) protocol. Zero-knowledge protocols allow a person (or a server, website,
etc.) demonstrate they have a certain piece of information without giving it away to the
person (or entity) they are convincing.
Suppose Alice knows how to solve the Rubik’s cube and wants to convince Bob she can do
so without giving away the solution. They could proceed as follows. Alice gives Bob a
Rubik’s cube which he thoroughly messes up and then gives it back to Alice. Alice turns
away from Bob, solves the puzzle and hands it back to Bob. So Bob is convinced that Alice
solved the puzzle without giving away the solution.
This idea may be adapted to an identification protocol if each person (or entity) is given a
“puzzle” and its answer or indeed each entity makes up a “puzzle” that only they themselves
can solve. The security of the system relies on the difficulty of solving the “puzzle”. In the
case above, if Alice was the only person who could solve a Rubik’s cube, then this could be
her puzzle.
The idea is to associate each person with something unique; something that only that person
can reproduce. This, in effect, takes the place of a face or voice, which are unique factors
allowing people to identify one another in the physical world. [6]
In general terms, an identification protocol involves a claimant A and a verifier B. The
verifier is presented with, or presumes beforehand, the purported identity of the claimant.
The goal is to corroborate that the identity of the claimant is indeed A, i.e. A provides entity
authentication.

3.1 The Objectives of Identification Schemes
From the point of view of the verifier, the outcome of an identification protocol is either
acceptance of the claimant’s identity as authentic or rejection of the claimant’s identity. More
specifically, the objectives of an identification protocol include the following:
1. In the case of honest parties A and B, A is able to successfully authenticate itself
to B; i.e. B will complete the protocol having accepted A’s identity.
2. B cannot reuse an identification exchange with A so as to successfully
impersonate A to a third party.
May 2002
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3. The probability is negligible that any party C distinct from A, carrying out the
protocol and playing the role of A, can cause B to complete and accept A’s
identity.
4. The previous points are true even if a large number of previous authentications
between A and B have been observed or indeed C has participated in previous
protocol executions with either or both A and B. [1]

3.2 Applications
There are many common everyday situations where it is necessary to prove “electronically”
one’s identity.
Typical scenarios include:
•

In consumer payment transactions, a token or a card may be presented, bearing an
identifier (a code), and a sample signature or an encoded PIN for automated
authentication processes.

•

To log in remotely to a computer over a network, it suffices to know a valid user name
and the corresponding password.

•

In establishing a new relationship between a customer and a financial institution, we may
need to provide a set of “tokens” such as a passport, driver’s licence and/or utility bills
bearing the applicant’s home address.

It is important to note that in all identification schemes or protocols the phrase “proof of
identity” should be avoided in favour of the term “evidence of identity”. [22]

3.3 Basis of Identification
Entity authentication techniques may be divided into three main categories, depending on
which of the following the security is based:
1. What you know.
Examples include standard passwords, passphrases, PINs and secret or private keys
whose knowledge is demonstrated in challenge-response protocols.
2. What you have.
This is normally a physical accessory like a passport or a magnetic-striped card like a
credit card. It also includes token-based systems, such as smartcards that have an
embedded microprocessor, or password generators that provide time-variant
May 2002
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passwords. Providing something you know – like a password, is usually augmented
by the possession of some object, to prove one’s identity.
For example, challenge-response systems can include a hand-held token, typically the
size of a small calculator, with a keypad. To access a system using challengeresponse technology, a user activates the token using a PIN and then enters into the
token a series of codes that are challenged by the system. This technology has some
limitations however, including the number of user steps, the longer time required to
authenticate the identity of a user and the size and complexity of the token.
3. What you are.
This category includes methods that make use of human physical characteristics or
involuntary response patterns known as biometrics. These include fingerprints, voice,
retinal patterns, hand geometry and face or body profile. [21]

3.4 The Quality of Identification Schemes
In each of the three methods outlined above, there is always the need to strike a balance
arising from:
•

False rejection (Type I error)

•

False acceptance (Type II error)

In a false rejection type error, an identity is accepted that should have been rejected, resulting
in the acceptance of imposters and mistaken identity. In a false acceptance type error, an
identity is not accepted that should have been, resulting in the rejection of correct matches.
Sources of poor quality identification include:
•

Accidental mistakes

•

Intentional mistakes, which include masquerading or spoofing (pretending to be a
different entity) and the avoidance of identification.

Where quality shortfalls occur, additional considerations come into play which include:
•

The repudiability of an assertion – for example the question of how an entity contests
information stored by another party.

•

The onus of proof – for example the need to establish on which entity the responsibility
lies to establish that data is or is not of appropriate quality. [7]

May 2002
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This balance depends on the extent of protections against abuse and hence if it can be
repudiated by the entity concerned. Hence we have the need for different levels of
authentication that depend on many factors such as our resources, the level of protection
that we require, the nature of the communication between the entities involved and the nature
of the network communication channels between source and destination.

4. Levels of authentication
There are three main levels of authentication, consisting of:
1. Weak authentication
2. Moderate authentication
3. Strong (zero-knowledge based) authentication

4.1 Weak authentication
Weak authentication may be sub-divided into one-stage authentication and two-stage
authentication.

4.1.1 One-stage authentication
In the case of one-stage authentication, end users need only one item of information to verify
the username they enter when they log on. This one item is usually a password, which often
remains the same for a significant amount of time. Furthermore, end users tend to use
passwords that are short and easy to remember – usually a family name or some word from a
standard dictionary.
Even if users keep their password secret, they maybe captured by protocol analysers or
maybe the subject of a dictionary attack. Although this brute method approach of finding a
particular user’s password is not very successful, they are successful at finding passwords in
most systems, given the predictable nature of most people’s passwords. This success rate is
largely due to the birthday paradox. The birthday paradox states the counterintuitive result
that the probability that two people share the same birthday in a group of 23 people is greater
than 0.5. [2]
A further drawback of this method is that it provides no guarantee against privileged insiders
or disgruntled employees gaining access to the stored passwords. One way to combat this
drawback is to store the passwords in an encrypted file. In this scenario, to verify a user-
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entered password, the system computes a one-way function of the entered password and
compares this to the stored entry for the stated user-id.
Let f (x) be a one-way function. This means it should be easy to compute f (x) but it should be
computationally infeasible for an opponent to calculate x given the value of y. [4] Generally
a problem that cannot be solved in polynomial time is considered infeasible or intractable.
Polynomial time in Big-O notation means that the running time of an algorithm with an input
of size n is O( n t ) for some constant t. [2]
Another method of making dictionary attacks less effective is that each password, upon initial
entry, is randomly padded with an additional 12-bit salt. The salt is a 12-bit random number
that is appended to the password resulting in 4,096 possible encryptions of the one password.
These 12 bits are then used to modify the function f (x). The result is stored in the password
file, along with the user’s name and the values of the 12-bit salt. When the user enters the
password x, the computer finds the value of the salt for this user in the file, which it then uses
in the computation of the modified f (x). This is then compared to the value stored in the file.
[5]
Another major weakness of schemes using fixed, reusable passwords is that passwords are
transmitted in cleartext over the communications link between the user and the system. An
eavesdropper may record this data, thus allowing subsequent impersonation.
4.1.2 Two-stage authentication
Token-based authentication is an example of two-stage authentication. In contrast to
password authentication, which relies solely on the use of a single password, two-stage
authentication incorporates a PIN in addition to a hardware or software device. Smart cards,
which are preprogrammed with unique passwords, are an example of hardware tokens.
Another scenario uses a physical device called a token, which generates a token code. The
token displays a new code every 60 seconds; therefore each token code is used only once.
[14]
Software tokens are generated by software installed on a computer. After being activated by a
user upon entering a PIN, a software token provides a unique password for authentication.
[15] Hardware tokens that generate One Time passwords seem like a great idea but they are
expensive. Additional costs include replacing lost tokens, and administering and updating the
authentication server’s database. For this reason they have not been widely adopted, even
though it’s a much more secure system than the use of passwords alone. [16]
May 2002
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4.2 Moderate authentication
A natural progression from fixed password schemes (weak authentication) to challengeresponse identification (strong authentication) may be observed by considering one-time
password schemes. [1] As mentioned earlier, a major security concern of fixed password
schemes is eavesdropping and subsequent replay of the password. A partial solution is the
use of one-time passwords, where each password is used only once. Such schemes are safe
from passive adversaries who eavesdrop and later attempt impersonation.
One variation of this one-time password scheme is the Lamport’s scheme, which is based
upon one-way functions. Lamport proposed an elegant scheme for one-time passwords
requiring no specialised hardware. A general-purpose computer can be used to generate
responses based on a secret reusable password. In the scheme, the user’s secret password is
never sent over an insecure link, where it could be captured by an eavesdropper. Say the
secret password is w. We then use a one-way function H. H is used to define a sequence of
passwords, w, H(w), H(H(w)), etc. A fixed number of identifications are initially agreed to
and each password in the sequence is then verified by the intended destination. If each
password in the sequence is accepted, then the destination accepts the source as authentic.
[10]
This scheme however remains vulnerable to an active adversary who intercepts and traps an
as-yet-unused one-time password, for the purposes of subsequent impersonation.
4.3 Strong authentication
As outlined earlier, the idea behind strong authentication techniques or challenge-response
protocols is that one entity (the claimant) “proves” its identity to another entity (the verifier)
by demonstrating knowledge of a secret only known to itself, without revealing the secret to
the verifier during the protocol. This forms the basis of all zero-knowledge techniques. The
Zero-Knowledge Identification Protocol (ZKIP) is part of an interactive proof system,
which uses zero-knowledge techniques in order to achieve identification.
Informally, an interactive proof is a protocol between two parties in which one party, called
the claimant, tries to prove a certain fact to the other party, called the verifier. An interactive
proof usually takes the form of a ZKIP protocol (or challenge-response protocol), in which
the claimant and the verifier exchange messages and the verifier either “accepts” or “rejects”
the fact that the claimant tries to prove. [6]
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More formally, the claimant’s objective is to prove to the verifier the truth of an assertion,
e.g. claimed knowledge of a secret. The verifier either accepts or rejects the proof. However,
in an interactive proof system such as this, the traditional mathematical notion of proof where
proofs are absolute, needs to be discarded. Instead, interactive proofs are probabilistic rather
than absolute and a proof in this context needs to be correct only with bounded probability,
albeit possibly arbitrarily close to 1.
Interactive proofs, used in cryptographic applications, have three essential properties:
1. Completeness
The verifier accepts the proof if the claimant knows the fact with an
overwhelming probability, and both the claimant and the verifier follow the
protocol. The definition of overwhelming probability depends on the application,
but it generally implies that the probability of failure is not of practical
significance.
2. Soundness
The verifier always rejects the proof, if the claimant does not know the fact, as
long as the verifier follows the protocol.
3. Zero-knowledge
The verifier learns nothing about the fact being proved (except that it is correct)
from the claimant that he/she could not already learned without the claimant. In a
zero-knowledge scheme, the verifier cannot even later prove the fact to anyone
else. The essential point here is that only a single bit of information need to be
conveyed – namely, that the claimant actually does know the fact that it wishes
to prove. [8]

5. Zero-Knowledge Identification Protocols (ZKIPs)
Some years ago, it was reported that some thieves set up a fake ATM machine in a shopping
centre. When a person inserted a bankcard and typed in their PIN identification, the machine
recorded the information but responded with the message that it could not accept the card.
The thieves then made counterfeit bank cards and then went to legitimate ATMs and
withdrew cash, using the PIN numbers they had obtained.
How can this be avoided? There are several situations where someone reveals a secret
identification number or password in order to complete a transaction. Anyone who obtains
May 2002
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the secret information can masquerade as this person. What is needed is a way to use the
secret information without giving away any of this secret information that can be reused by
an eavesdropper. This is where zero-knowledge techniques come in.
Quisquater et al, [9], explain zero-knowledge protocols by retelling the legendary story of Ali
Baba and the Forty Thieves.
Alice wants to prove to Bob that she knows the secret words that will open the door at CD in
the cave, but she does not wish to reveal the secret to Bob. In this scenario, Alice’s
commitment is to go to C or D. A typical round in the proof proceeds as follows:

Bob goes to A and waits there while Alice goes to C or D. Bob then goes to B and shouts to
Alice to appear from either the right side or the left side of the tunnel. If Alice does not know
the secret words “Open Sesame”, there is only a 50% chance that she will come out of the
side of the tunnel requested by Bob. Bob can repeat this challenge as many times as he
desires, until he is certain that Alice knows the secret words. In each round, of course, Alice
randomly chooses which side of the tunnel she will go down and Bob randomly chooses
which side he will request. Therefore, if Alice comes out the correct side of the tunnel for
each of 10 consecutive repetitions, say, there is only one chance in 210 = 1024 that Alice
doesn’t know how to go through the door CD.
No matter how many times the proof repeats, Bob will never learn the secret words.
Suppose Oscar is watching the proceedings on a video monitor set up at B. He will not be
able to use anything he sees to convince Bob or anyone else that he, too, can go through the
door. Moreover, he might not even be convinced that Alice can go through the door. After all,
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Alice and Bob could have planned the sequence of rights and lefts in advance. By this
reasoning, there is no useful information that Bob obtains that can be transmitted to anyone.
Note that there is never a proof, in the strict mathematical sense, that Alice can go through
the door. But there is overwhelming evidence (the overwhelming probability referred to
earlier) that she can, obtained through a series of challenges and responses. This is, in
essence, the nature of zero-knowledge “proofs”.

6. Mathematics of Zero-Knowledge Protocols
Zero-knowledge Identification Protocols (ZKIP) are based on Euler’s totient function and
discrete logarithms over the subgroup Z/nZ. [11]
6.1 Euler’s Totient Function

Euler’s Totient Function
Euler’s Totient function is written as φ (n), where φ (n) is the number of positive integers
less than and relatively prime to n.

Definition
The integers a and b are relatively prime if they have no prime factors in common, that is, if
their only common factor is 1. This is equivalent to saying that a and b are relatively prime if
gcd (a,b) = 1 where gcd (a, b) stands for the Greatest Common Divisor of a and b.
Example:

φ (21) = 12 where the 12 integers are {1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20}
It follows from the above that for a prime number p

φ ( p) = p − 1
Now suppose that we have two prime numbers p and q. Then for n = pq

φ ( pq ) = ( p − 1)(q − 1)
Example:
21 = (3)(7)
So φ (21) = (3 – 1)(7 – 1) = 12 and the 12 integers are listed above.
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6.2 Congruences

Definition
Let a, b, n be integers.
We say that a ≡ b mod n
i.e. a is congruent to b mod n if a – b is a multiple of n.

6.3 The Extended Euclidean Algorithm
Theorem

b ∈ Z n has a multiplicative inverse if and only if gcd (b, n) = 1
The set of residues modulo n that are relatively prime to n is denoted by Z n* . Any element in

Z n* will have a multiplicative inverse b −1 , which is also in Z n* .
The extended Euclidean algorithm is an efficient way to compute b −1 . [24]
Example:
Compute 28 −1 mod 75
Solution:
75 = 2 × 28 + 19
73 × 28 mod 75 = 19
28 = 1 × 19 + 9
3 × 28 mod 75 = 9
19 = 2 × 9 + 1
67 × 28 mod 75 = 1
9=9 × 1
Hence, 28 −1 mod 75 = 67
Proposition
Suppose gcd (a, n) = 1.
Let s and t be integers such that as + nt = 1. Integers s and t can be found using the Extended
Euclidean algorithm.
Then as ≡ 1 mod n, so s is the multiplicative inverse for a (mod n).
May 2002
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6.3.1 Solving

ax ≡ c

mod n when gcd (a, n) = 1

1. Use the Extended Euclidean algorithm to find integers s and t such that as + nt = 1.
2. The solution is x ≡ cs mod n.
Example:
Solve 11111x ≡ 4 mod 12345
Solution:
Using the Extended Euclidean algorithm, we find that
11111.2471 + 12345. t = 1
Hence 11111.2471 ≡ 1 mod 12345
Multiplying each side by 2471 yields

x ≡ 9884 mod 12345.
In practice, this means that if we are working mod 12345 and we meet the fraction

4
, we can replace it with 9884.
11111
6.4 Chinese Remainder Theorem
Suppose gcd (m, n) = 1. Given a and b, there exists exactly one solution x (mod mn) to the
simultaneous congruences x ≡ a mod m and x ≡ b mod n
Example:
Solve x ≡ 3 mod 7 and x ≡ 5 mod 15
Solution:

x ≡ 80 mod 105 since 105 = 7.15
Since 80 ≡ 3 mod 7 and 80 ≡ 5 mod 15 , 80 is a solution. [23]
6.5 Modular Exponentiation
We now consider numbers in the form x a mod n.
Example:
Suppose we want to compute 21234 mod 789.
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Solution:
We could perform each multiplication and then work out the remainder. This method
is too slow to be of any practical value, so instead we begin with 2 2 ≡ 4 mod 789
and repeatedly square both sides as follows:

2 4 ≡ 4 2 ≡ 16
2 8 ≡ 16 2 ≡ 256
:
:
:

21024 ≡ 286
Since 1234 = 1024 + 128 + 64 + 16 + 2
we have 21234 ≡ 286.559.367.49.4 ≡ 481 mod 789.
6.6 Fermat’s Little Theorem
Fermat’s Little Theorem
If p is a prime and p does not divide a, then a p −1 ≡ 1 mod p
Example:
Compute 2 43210 mod 101
Solution:
From Fermat’s Theorem, we know that 2100 ≡ 1 mod 101.
Therefore, 2 43210 ≡ (2100 ) 432 210 ≡ 1432 210 ≡ 1024 ≡ 14 mod 101.
6.7 Euler’s Theorem
Euler’sTheorem
For every a and n that are relatively prime, a φ ( n ) ≡ 1 mod n
Example:
If a = 3 and n = 10,

φ (10) = 4 and 3 4 = 81 ≡ 1 mod 10
Definition

Z n* denotes the set of numbers i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n , which are relatively prime to n.

Example:
May 2002
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Z 9* = {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8}
Multiplication Table

* mod 9

1

2

4

5

7

8

1

1

2

4

5

7

8

2

2

4

8

1

5

7

4

4

8

7

2

1

5

5

5

1

2

7

8

4

7

7

5

1

8

4

2

8

8

7

5

4

2

1

Theorem
Z n* forms a group under modulo n multiplication. The identity element is e = 1.

Definition
The order of an element a ∈ (G ,o) is the smallest positive integer such that

a o a o ..... o a = a 0 = 1 where o is some binary operation defined on the group G.
So, for example, from the multiplication table above, the order of a = 2 in ( Z 9* ,×) is 6
because 2 6 = 1 , i.e. ord (2) = 6.
In fact, we know that if p is prime, then Z *p is a group of order p – 1.
Definition
A group (G ,o) which contains elements a with maximum order ord (a) = | G | is said
to be cyclic. Elements with maximum order are called generators or primitive
elements (roots) of the group (G ,o) .

Note: |G| is the number of elements in the group G. [23]
This, in effect, implies that if p is prime, then the group Z *p is in fact cyclic: there exists an
element a ∈ Z *p having order equal to p – 1.
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Theorem
If p is prime, then Z *p is a cyclic group.
Example:
Suppose p = 13.
Then 2 is a primitive element modulo 13 because

2 i mod 13 = 2, 4, 8, 3, 6, 12, 11, 9, 5, 10, 7, 1 where 1 ≤ i ≤ 12 .
*
i.e. 2 generates all 12 elements of Z 13
.

The element 2 i is primitive if and only if gcd (i, 12) = 1, i.e., i = 1, 5, 7 or 11.
Hence, the primitive elements modulo 13 are 2, 6, 7 and 11.
More generally, we can say that the highest possible exponent to which a number can belong
(mod n) is φ (n) . If a number is of this order, it is referred to as a primitive element of n,
i.e. a, a 2 ,....., a φ ( n )
are distinct (mod n) and are all relatively prime to n.
This implies that a φ ( n ) ≡ 1 mod n…………. Euler’s Theorem
6.8 Square Roots Mod n
How do we find the solution or solutions to x 2 ≡ 71 mod 77? Or more generally, consider
the problem of finding all the solutions of x 2 ≡ b mod n, where n = pq is the product of two
primes. It can be shown that this can be done quite easily once the factorisation of n is
known. Conversely, if we know all the solutions, then it is easy to factor n.
Proposition
Let p ≡ 3 mod 4 be prime and let y be an integer. Let x ≡ y ( p +1) / 4 mod p
1. If y has a square root mod p; then the square roots of y mod p are ± x .
2. If y has no square root mod p, then – y has a square root mod p, and the
square roots of – y are ± x.

Example 1:
Solve the equation x 2 ≡ 5 mod 11
Solution:
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Since (p + 1)/4 = 3,
we compute x ≡ 5 3 ≡ 4 mod 11.
Since 4 2 ≡ 5 mod 11,

x = ±4 .
Example 2:
Solve the equation x 2 ≡ 71 mod 77
Solution:

x 2 ≡ 71 ≡ 1 mod 7 and x 2 ≡ 71 ≡ 5 mod 11.
Therefore, x ≡ ±1 mod 7 and x ≡ ±4 mod 11.
Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we can combine a congruence mod 7 and a
congruence mod 11 into a congruence mod 77.
Here, we recombine in four ways to get the solutions x ≡ ±15, ± 29 mod 77
It follows from the above that if a ≡ b mod p and a ≡ −b mod q, gcd (a – b, n) = p and
we have found a nontrivial factor of

n =

pq. In the example above, we know that

15 2 ≡ 29 2 ≡ 71 mod 77 .Therefore, gcd (15 – 29, 77) = 7 gives a nontrivial factor of 77.
We can now state in summary an important result:
Suppose n = pq is the product of two primes congruent to 3 mod 4, and suppose y is a
number relatively prime to n which has a square root mod n.
Then finding the four solutions x ≡ ± a, ± b to x 2 ≡ y mod n is computationally
equivalent to factoring n.
6.9 Finite Fields
Loosely speaking, a set that has the operations of addition, multiplication, subtraction and
division by nonzero elements is called a field.
Examples of fields include real numbers, complex numbers and the integers mod a prime
number, i.e. Z p . But the set of all integers is not a field because we sometimes cannot divide
and obtain an answer in the set, e.g. 4/3 is not an integer. [25]
6.10 The Discrete Logarithm Problem
We begin by describing the problem in the setting of a finite field Z p , where p is prime. The
problem is considered to be difficult if p is carefully chosen.
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In particular, there is no known polynomial-time algorithm for the Discrete Logarithm
problem. To thwart known attacks, p should be at least 150 digits and p – 1 should have at
least one “large” prime factor. [3]
The main advantage of the Discrete Logarithm problem in challenge-response protocols (and
indeed in cryptography generally) is that finding discrete logs is difficult, but the inverse
operation of exponentiation can be computed efficiently. Stated another way, exponentiation
modulo p is a one-way function for suitable primes p, i.e. it is computationally infeasible.
The Discrete Logarithm problem can be formally stated as follows:
We assume that p is prime and α is a primitive element modulo p. We take p and α to be
fixed. From the foregoing discussion, we know that the powers of α from 1 through to (p –
1) produce each integer from 1 through (p – 1) exactly once.
It follows, therefore, that given β ∈ Z *p , we can find the unique exponent a, 0 ≤ a ≤ p − 1 ,
such that α a ≡ β (mod p ) . In other words, taking logs, we have a = log α ( β )
The problem of finding a is called the Discrete Logarithm problem. Note that if we dispensed
with the requirement that α be a primitive root, then the discrete logarithm will not be
defined for certain values of β .

7. Identification Protocols
7.1 General structure of Zero-Knowledge Protocols
The Fiat-Shamir protocol illustrates the general structure of a large class of three-move zeroknowledge protocols:
A → B:

witness

B → A:

challenge

A → B:

response

The design of these protocols ensures that only the legitimate party A, with knowledge of A’s
secret, is truly capable of answering all the questions. Furthermore, the answer to any of these
questions provides no information about A’s long-term secret.
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A responds to at most one challenge (question) for a given witness, and should not reuse any
witness. [1]
7.2 Fiat-Shamir Identification Protocol
What follows is a basic version of the Fiat-Shamir Zero-Knowledge protocol. The objective
is for Alice to identify herself by proving knowledge of a secret s to any verifier such as Bob
or a trusted centre called Tom, without revealing any information about s not known or
computable by Bob or Tom prior to execution of the protocol. The security of the method
relies on the difficulty of extracting square roots, modulo large composite integers n of
unknown factorisation, which is equivalent to factoring n.
The protocol involves the following steps:
1. One-time setup
(i)

A trusted authority – call it Tom – selects two large prime numbers p and q,
calculates n = pq, publishes n, and keeps the primes secret.

(ii)

Alice, a user of the centre, selects a number s in the range 1 to n – 1 that is
relatively prime to n, calculates v = s 2 mod n , registers v as her public key
with Tom, keeps her password s secret and carries both s and v with her.

(iii)

Alice and Bob agree on a maximum number of rounds t of the identification
protocol that will be carried out at login.

2. Protocol messages
Each of t rounds has three messages as follows:
Alice → Bob:

x = r 2 mod n

Bob → Alice:

e ∈ {0, 1}

Alice → Bob:

y = r.s e mod n

3. Protocol actions
The following steps are iterated t times – sequentially and independently. Bob
accepts the proof if all t rounds succeed.
(i)

Alice first generates a random number r in the range 1 to n – 1. This is
called her commitment. She calculates x = r 2 mod n - called her
witness – and sends x to Bob.

(ii)

On receiving x, Bob selects a bit e, either 0 or 1, at random – called a
challenge and sends e to Alice.
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(iii) On receiving e, Alice calculates y = r.s e mod n . If e = 0 then y = r and if
e = 1, y = r.s mod n.
y is called the response. She sends y to Bob.
(iv)

Receiving y, Bob calculates

z = y 2 mod n
and

z ' = x.v e mod n
If z ≠ z ' , he refuses the login from Alice; if z = z ' , he accepts the round
of the protocol. [1]
In the later case, if fewer than t rounds have been carried out, Alice starts a new round by
picking another number at random and if t rounds are all successful, Alice’s identification is
complete and she is logged in.
The following congruences show that Alice will be able to prove her identity to Bob:

xv e ≡ r 2 v e mod n
≡ r 2 s 2e mod n

≡ (rs e )(rs e ) mod n
≡ y 2 mod n
So Bob will accept Alice’s proof of identity.
7.3 Example to illustrate the Fiat-Shamir Protocol
1. One-time setup
(i)
Suppose p = 37 and q = 101; then n = 37.101 = 3737.
(ii)

If Alice selects s = 113 (which is relatively prime to n), then her public key is

v = s 2 mod 3737 = 113 2 mod 3737 = 1558 .
(iii)

Bob and Alice now agree on t = 8 rounds of the protocol. This completes the
setup.

2. Protocol Actions
(i)
Now Alice wants to login from a remote location. She chooses a number at
random: r = 3284 (her commitment).
Then her witness is x = 3284 2 mod 3737 = 3411 .
She sends her public key 1558 and her witness 3411 to Bob.
(ii)
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e = 1. He sends 1 to Alice.
(iii)

On receiving e = 1,
Alice calculates y = 3284.1131 = 1129 (mod 3737).
She sends this back to Bob (the response).

(iv)

He then verifies z = y 2 mod 3737 = 1129 2 mod 3737 = 324
and z ' = x.v e mod 3737 = 3411.1558 mod 3737 = 324 .

Because these two values are the same, Bob accepts the first round of the protocol. Say z and

z ' agree over 8 rounds of the protocol. Bob estimates that the probability this person is not
Alice is
8

æ1ö
ç ÷ ≈ 0.0039 .
è 2ø
From Bob’s perspective, the probability that it is Alice is 1 – 0.0039 = 0.9961.
7.4 Security of Fiat-Shamir Protocol
An adversary, Oscar, could try guessing Bob’s challenge for each round of the protocol. So if
Oscar can guess Bob’s challenge correctly for each of t rounds of the protocol, he can fool
Bob into believing that Oscar is in fact Alice. The chances of Oscar completing t rounds of
the protocol successfully is
t

1
1 1 1
æ1ö
. . ....... (t times) = ç ÷ .
2
2 2 2
è 2ø
With t = 20 rounds, the probability of Oscar succeeding in impersonating Alice is
0.000976563 – an extremely unlikely event! Now suppose that Oscar listens in on the
protocol between Alice and Bob. Can he infer from it the value of s? At each round, he will
only see v, e and y.
In round 1, in our example, because e = 1, Oscar will know that r.s = 1129 (mod 3737) and

r 2 = 3411 (mod 3737).
He could calculate the square root of 3411 mod 3737 by trail and error, find r and solve for s.
With such a small value of n as in this example, this would pose little difficulty. But in real
implementations of the protocol, n will be of the order of 200 decimal digits and then the
square root problem becomes intractable. So the effectiveness of the protocol depends on
the purported intractability of the square root problem modulo pq (= n).
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7.5 Feige-Fiat-Shamir (FSS) Identification Protocol
The Fiat-Shamir protocol described above can be generalised and the FSS protocol is an
example of one such generalisation.
In summary, Alice has secret numbers s1 , s 2 ,........, s k .
Let vi ≡ s i−2 (mod n), where we assume gcd ( s i , n) = 1.
The numbers vi are sent to Bob. Bob will try to verify that Alice knows the numbers

s1 , s 2 ,........, s k .
The protocol involves the following steps:
1. One-time setup:
(i)

A trusted authority – call it Tom – selects two large prime numbers p and
q, congruent to 3 mod 4, calculates n = pq, publishes n, and keeps the
primes secret. Tom also publishes the parameters k, the key size and t,
the number of protocol iterations.

(ii)

Alice, a user of the centre, selects k secret random numbers

s1 , s 2 ,........, s k in the range 1 ≤ si ≤ n − 1 where gcd ( s i , n) = 1.
This ensures that n cannot be factored easily.
(ii)

Alice computes

(v1 ,.........., vk ; n ) ,

vi ≡ s i−2 (mod n) and registers her public key
while

only

Alice

knows

her

private

key

( s1 , s 2 ,........, s k ) and n.
2. Protocol messages
Each of t rounds has 3 messages as follows:
Alice → Bob : x ≡ r 2 (mod n)
Bob → Alice : (e1 ,..........., ek ) , ei ∈ {0, 1}
e e
e
Alice → Bob : y ≡ r.s1 1 s 22 ........s k k mod n
3. Protocol actions

(i) Alice chooses a random number r (the commitment), computes

x ≡ r 2 (mod n) (the witness) and sends x to Bob.
(ii) Bob chooses numbers (e1 ,..........., ek ) , ei ∈ {0, 1}. He sends these to Alice.
e e
e
(iii) Alice computes y ≡ r.s1 1 s 22 ........s k k (mod n) and sends y (the response) to
Bob.
(iv) Bob checks that x ≡ y 2 v1e1 v 2e2 .........v kek (mod n)
(v) Steps (i) through (iv) are repeated t times.
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The following congruences show that Alice will be able to prove her identity to Bob:

x ≡ y 2 v1e1 v 2e2 .........v kek mod n
≡ (r 2 s12e1 ..........s k2ek )(v1e1 ..........v kek ) mod n
≡ (r 2 s12e1 ...........s k2ek )( s1−2 e1 .........s k−2ek ) mod n

≡ r 2 mod n
So Bob will accept Alice’s proof of identity.
7.6 Example to illustrate the FFS Protocol
1. One-time setup
(i) Tom (the trusted centre) selects the primes p = 683, q = 811 and publishes n
= pq = 553913. Integers k = 3 and t = 1 are defined as security parameters.
(ii) Alice selects 3 random numbers s1 = 157, s 2 = 43215, s3 = 4646.
(iii) Alice computes v1 ≡ s1−2 (mod n) = 441845, v 2 =338402
and v3 = 124423.
Alice’s public key is (441845, 338402, 124423; 553913) and her private key
is (157,43215, 4646).
2. Protocol actions
(i)
Alice chooses r = 1279 (the commitment), computes

x = r 2 mod n = 25898 and sends x to Bob.
(ii)

Bob sends to Alice (the challenge) the 3-bit vector (0, 0, 1).

(iii)

e e
e
Alice computes y ≡ r.s1 1 s 22 ........s k k = r. s31 mod n = 403104 and sends y

(the response) to Bob.
(iv)

(iv)

Bob computes z ≡ y 2 v1e1 v 2e2 .......v kek (mod n) = y 2 .v31 mod n = 25898

and accepts Alice’s identity since z = x.

[1]

7.7 Security of Feige-Fiat-Shamir (FFS) Protocol
The security of the FFS protocol relies on the difficulty of extracting square roots modulo n.
This is equivalent to factoring n. The best attack, using a chosen message, has a probability

2 − k t of successful impersonation.
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An adversary, Oscar, who doesn’t know the numbers s1 , s 2 ,........, s k , could try and guess the
string of bits (e1 ,..........., ek ) that Bob will send. He lets y be a random number and declares

x ≡ y 2 v1e1 v 2e2 .........v kek (mod n). When Bob sends the string of bits, Oscar sends back the
value of y.
For example, suppose Oscar can guess the correct response when e1 = 1 , e2 = 1, e4 = 1 and
all other ei = 0. However, suppose Bob sends e1 = 1 , e3 = 1 and all other ei = 0. Then
Oscar, posing as Alice, will be ready to supply a square root of xv1 v 2 v 4 , but will be asked to
supply a square root of xv1v3 . This, combined with what he already knows, is equivalent to
knowing a square root of v 2−1 v3 v 4−1 , which he is not able to compute.
In effect, there are 2 k possible strings of bits that Bob can send to fool Oscar. In one
iteration of the protocol, the chances are only one in 2 k that Bob will be fooled. If the
procedure is repeated t times, the chances are one in 2 kt that Oscar will be fooled.
Recommended values are k = 5 and t = 4, which gives the same probability as 20 iterations of
the previous Fiat-Shamir scheme or 1 in a million chance of impersonation. So the FFS
protocol is more efficient in terms of communication between Alice and Bob.
FFS is a pretty simple, and effective zero-knowledge proof. There is, however, an important
security tradeoff that needs to be addressed. If you set

t = 1, computation and

communications can be reduced. Also, while holding kt constant, and incrementing k, while
decrementing t, will result in the protocol no longer being able to hold the concept of proof of
knowledge. This means that as t approaches 1, the protocol become less and less sound. [17]
7.8 FFS as an Identity-Based Scheme
Let S be a string that includes Alice’s name, address and date of birth. Let f be a one-way
function (a public hash function, for example). A trusted authority, Tom (could be a bank,
for example), chooses n = pq as before and then computes Alice’s public values

vi = f(S, i), 1 ≤ i ≤ k .
Now, Tom, knowing the factorisation of n, computes a square root s i for each vi , and gives
these to Alice. Tom can now discard s1 , s 2 ,........, s k and the values of p and q. This adds to
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the security of the scheme since someone who breaks into Tom’s computer cannot
compromise Alice’s security.
Say Alice goes to an ATM for example. The ATM reads S from Alice’s card. It downloads

(v1 ,.........., vk ; n ) from a database. The FFS protocol is then performed to verify that Alice
knows s1 , s 2 ,........, s k . After a few iterations, the ATM is convinced that the person is in fact
Alice and allows her to withdraw cash.
To avoid a lot of typing on Alice’s part, a better implementation would be to use chips
embedded in the card and store the data in such a way that it cannot be extracted. [5]
7.9 Schnorr Identification Protocol
1. Setup
A trusted authority – Tom – chooses the following parameters:
(i) p is a large prime such that the discrete logarithm problem in Z *p is
intractable.
(ii) q is a large prime divisor of p – 1.
(iii) α ∈ Z *p has order q, i.e. if β is a primitive element mod p, then

α = β ( p −1) / q mod p.
(iv) A security parameter t such that q > 2 t . For most applications, t = 40
provides adequate security.
(v) Tom also establishes a secure signature scheme with a secret signing
algorithm sig Tom and a public verification algorithm verTom .
(vi) A secure hash function is specified. The hash function is used to hash the
message before it is signed.
2. Issuing a certificate to Alice
(i) Tom establishes Alice’s identity by means of conventional forms of
identification such as birth certificate or passport. Then Tom forms a string
ID (Alice) which contains her identity information.
(ii) Alice secretly chooses a random exponent a, where 0 ≤ a ≤ q − 1 . She then
computes v = α − a mod p and gives v to Tom.
(iii) Tom generates a signature s = sig Tom (ID (Alice), v)
and gives the certificate cert Alice = (ID(Alice), v, s) to Alice.
3.
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Alice → Bob :

cert Alice and x = α r mod p

Bob → Alice:

e, 1 ≤ e ≤ 2 t

Alice → Bob:

y = r + ae mod q

4. Protocol actions
(i) Alice chooses a random number r (the commitment), where 0 ≤ r ≤ q − 1 .
She then calculates (the witness) x = α r mod p
and sends her certificate cert Alice = (ID(Alice), v, s) and x to Bob.
(ii) Bob verifies the signature of Tom by checking that

verTom (ID(Alice), v, s) = true
(iii) Bob chooses a random number e (the challenge), 1 ≤ e ≤ 2 t and sends it to
Alice.
(iv) Alice computes y = r + ae mod q and sends y to Bob.
(v) Bob verifies that z ≡ α y v e mod p and accepts Alice’s identity if z = x.
For discrete logarithms to be computationally infeasible (or intractable), we require that

p ≥ 21024 and q ≥ 2160 .
There are two things happening in this identification protocol: Firstly, the signature s proves
the validity of Alice’s certificate. So Bob verifies the signature of Tom on Alice’s certificate
to convince himself that the certificate itself is authentic. Secondly, the value a functions like
a PIN in that it convinces Bob that the person carrying out the protocol is indeed Alice.
The following congruences show that Alice will be able to prove her identity to Bob:

α y v e ≡ α r + ae v e mod p
≡ α r + aeα − ae mod p
≡ α r mod p

≡ x mod p
So Bob will accept Alice’s proof of identity.
The Schnorr scheme is designed to be very fast and efficient, both from a computational
viewpoint and the amount of information that needs to be exchanged in the protocol. It is also
designed to minimise the amount of computation done by Alice. This makes it quite attractive
in applications where Alice can use a smart card and where Bob needs to perform more
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complex computations. [3] To illustrate the point above, assume that ID (Alice) is a 512-bit
string, v is also 512 bits and s will be 320 bits if the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is used
as a signature scheme. The total size of the certificate which needs to be stored on Alice’s
card is then 1344 bits. Now we can calculate the number of bits that are communicated
during the protocol. Recall the 3 steps of the protocol.
Alice → Bob :

cert Alice and x = α r mod p

Bob → Alice:

e, 1 ≤ e ≤ 2 t

Alice → Bob:

y = r + ae mod q

Alice sends to Bob 1344 + 512 = 1856 bits of information in step 1.
Bob sends Alice 40 bits in step 2.
Alice sends 140 bits in step 3.
So the communication requirements are quite modest. [3]
The computations performed by Alice require the modular exponentiation x = α r mod p,
which, although computationally intensive, can be performed offline. The computation of y
= r + ae mod q comprises one modular addition and one modular multiplication, which is not
computationally intensive.
On the other hand, Bob’s calculations are computationally intensive, since he has to verify
Tom’s signature on Alice’s certificate and also verify that z ≡ α y v e mod p ≡ x . A hash
function is a one-way function that produces a message digest of the entire message. The
message digest is combined with Alice’s secret key to produce Alice’s digital signature. [18]
7.10 Example of Schnorr Identification Protocol
1. Setup
(i)

Suppose p = 88667, q = 1031 and p – 1 is divisible by the prime q.
The element α = 70322 has order q in Z *p , where α = β ( p −1) / q mod p
and β is a primitive element of Z *p .

(ii)

Suppose Alice’s secret exponent is a = 755 then

v = α − a mod p
= 703221031− 755 mod 88667
= 13136
2. Protocol actions
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(i)

Now Alice chooses r = 543. She then computes:

x = α r mod p
= 70322 543 mod 88667
= 84109.
She sends x to Bob.
(ii) Bob sends the challenge e = 1000 to Alice.
(iii)

Now Alice computes y = r + ae mod q
=543 + 755.1000 mod 1031
= 851
and sends y to Bob.

(iv) Bob then verifies that

x ≡ z ≡ α y v e mod p
i.e. 84109 ≡ 70322 851131361000 mod 88667.
and accepts Alice’s identity if z ≡ x .
7.11 Security of Schnorr Protocol
While it is our hope that an adversary, Oscar, will not gain any information about a when
Alice proves her identity (zero-knowledge property), the Schnorr identification protocol has
not been proven secure. The protocol is not secure for large e, because through interaction,
Bob obtains the solution (x, y, e) to the equation α y v e ≡ x mod p, which Bob himself might
not be able to compute.
But a modification to the Schnorr scheme was designed by Okamoto, which can be proven to
be secure. The main difference between the two schemes is that instead of Tom choosing

α ∈ Z *p of order q
as in the Schnorr scheme, Tom instead chooses two elements

α 1 ,α 2 ∈ Z *p , both of order q.
Tom keeps the value c = log α1 α 2 secret from all participants including Alice, which we
assume is infeasible for any adversary to compute. [3]
Although an adversary, Oscar, could gain access to Alice’s correct certificate (since the
information on a certificate is revealed each time the identification is run), he will not be able
to impersonate Alice unless he knows the value of a. Oscar would have to compute y for each
round, but y is a function of a. The computation of a from v involves a discrete logarithm
problem, which we assume is intractable.
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7.12 Application of Schnorr Identification Scheme
Stefan Brand [18] has developed a system of digital cash, which uses the Schnorr
identification protocol twice. Digital cash refers to electronic records or messages which
serve as money and can be authenticated by the institution granting the digital cash.
Essentially, it is a payment message bearing a digital signature that functions as a medium of
exchange. [19]
When a customer (Alice) withdraws a “coin” from a bank, the bank binds the user’s identity
to the “coin”, but sends along additional information that allows the customer to blind the
signed “coin” as seen by the bank. Blinding is the process by which a bank cannot identify
the person who withdrew the “coin”. While this maintains the customer’s identity, it poses
the problem for the bank of identifying double-spenders.
Alice challenges the bank to prove knowledge of its secret key. This verifies that the bank has
provided a valid signature on the “coin”. When Alice spends the blinded “coin”, the merchant
challenges her to provide knowledge of her secret key. The merchant records the challenge
and response and gives this to the bank as part of the “coin” deposit protocol. If the bank
receives the same “coin” twice, the challenge and response will reveal Alice’s identity if
Alice was responsible for double-spending. [20]
7.13 Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) Identification Protocol
The GQ protocol is an extension to the Fiat-Shamir protocol. It allows a reduction in both the
number of messages exchanged and memory requirements for user secrets. Furthermore, like
the Fiat-Shamir scheme, it is suitable for applications in which the claimant has limited
power and memory.
Alice proves her identity to Bob in a 3-pass protocol.
1. Setup
(i) A trusted authority – call it Tom – selects two large prime numbers p and q,
and calculates n = pq.
(ii) Tom defines a large prime integer b that functions as a security parameter.
(iii) Alice secretly chooses an integer u, where 0 ≤ u ≤ n − 1 . Alice computes

v = u − b mod n and gives v to Tom.
The trusted authority, Tom, establishes Alice’s identity (as in the Schnorr
scheme) and issues the identification string ID (Alice).
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The certificate cert Alice = (ID(Alice), v, s) is given to Alice where

s = sig Tom ( ID(Alice),v).
2. Protocol messages:
The protocol involves 3 messages:
Alice → Bob : cert Alice and x = r b mod n
Bob → Alice:e, 1 ≤ e ≤ b − 1
Alice → Bob:

y = ru e mod n

3. Protocol actions:
(i)

Alice chooses a random r (the commitment), 0 ≤ r ≤ n − 1 and computes

(ii)

x = r b mod n and sends her certificate cert Alice = (ID(Alice), v, s) and
x to Bob.

(iii)

Bob verifies the signature of Tom by checking that

verTom (ID(Alice), v, s) = true
(iv)

Bob chooses a random number e, 1 ≤ e ≤ b − 1 and sends it to Alice.

(v)

Alice computes y = r u e mod n and sends it to Bob.

(vi)

Bob verifies that

x ≡ v e y b mod n.

The following congruences show that Alice will be able to prove her identity to Bob:

v e y b ≡ u − be (ru e ) b mod n
≡ u − be r b u eb mod n

≡ r b mod n
≡ x mod n
So Bob will accept Alice’s proof of identity.
7.14 Example of Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) Identification Protocol
1. Setup
(i)

The trusted authority, Tom, selects primes p = 467, q = 479 and
computes

(ii)

n = pq = 223693.

(iii) Suppose also that b = 503 and Alice’s secret integer u = 101576.
Alice computes

v = u − b mod n
May 2002

Page 43

ITB Journal

= 101576 −503 mod 223693
= 89888
and gives this value to Tom.
2. Protocol actions
(i)

Alice selects r = 187485 and computes

x = r b mod n
= 187485 503 mod 223693
= 24412.
(ii)

Alice now sends cert Alice and x = 24412 to Bob.

(iii)

Bob verifies the signature of Tom on Alice’s certificate by checking
that verTom (ID(Alice), v, s) = true.

(iv)

Now Bob sends a random challenge e = 375.

(vii)

Alice replies with y = r. u e mod n
= 187485. 101576 375 mod 223693
= 93725
and sends it to Bob.

(viii)

Bob then verifies that

x ≡ v e y b mod n
i.e. 24412 ≡ 89888 375 93725 503 mod 223693.
Hence Bob accepts Alice’s proof of identity.

7.15 Security of Guillou-Quisquater Protocol
Extracting b th roots modulo the composite integer n is necessary to defeat the protocol; this
is no harder than factoring n, which we already know to be computationally intractable.

8. Comparison of Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr and Guillou-Quisquater Protocols
Each of these protocols provides solutions to the identification problem. Each has relative
advantages and disadvantages with respect to various performance criteria and for specific
applications.Each protocol can be compared under the following criteria:
1.

Computational efficiency
Fiat-Shamir requires from 11 to about 30 modular multiplications or steps by the
claimant (Alice) with kt = 20 and n is 512 bits while GQ requires about 60 steps.
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2.

Offline computations
The Schnorr scheme has the advantage of requiring only a single online modular
multiplication by the claimant. This assumes (as outlined earlier) that the
exponentiation is done beforehand. However, significant computations is required by
the verifier (Bob) compared to the Fiat-Shamir or GQ scheme.

3.

Security assumptions

All the protocols require the assumptions that the following problems are intractable:
For a composite integer n:
Fiat-Shamir – extracting square roots mod n
Schnorr – computing discrete logs mod a prime number p.
Guillou-Quisquater – extracting b th roots mod n

9. Zero-Knowledge Identification from a Geometric Perspective
In their paper, “Identification by Angle Trisection”, Burmester et al, [13], describe an elegant
zero-knowledge scheme based on the impossibility of trisecting an angle using a ruler and
compass only.
1. Setup
Alice publishes a copy of an angle Y A , which is constructed by Alice as the triple
of an angle X A , that she has constructed at random. Because trisection of an
angle is impossible using a ruler and compass only, Alice is confident that she is
the only one who knows X A .
2. Protocol actions
It follows the standard form of an iterated 3-round protocol:
(ii)

Alice gives Bob a copy of an angle R, which she has constructed as the
triple of an angle K that she has selected at random.

(iii) Bob flips a coin, and tells Alice the result.
(iv)

If Bob says “heads”, Alice gives Bob a copy of the angle K and Bob checks
that 3 * K = R. If Bob says “tails”, Alice gives Bob a copy of the angle
L=K+ XA,
and Bob checks that
3 * L = R + YA .

The three steps are repeated t-times independently. Bob accepts Alice’s proof of identity only
if all t checks are successful.
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10. Converting Identification to Signature Schemes
An identification scheme involving a witness-challenge-response sequence can be converted
to a signature scheme as follows:
Replace the random challenge e of the claimant by the one-way public hash function h of the
witness x and the message m to be signed. This, in effect, converts an interactive
identification scheme to a non-interactive signature scheme. The challenge e must typically
be increased to avoid off-line attacks on the hash function.

11. Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the need for identification protocols that ensure that two
parties prove their identity to each other before the actual transfer of information takes place
between them. We focussed our attention upon identification schemes that are based on
challenge-response protocols. In particular, we examined in detail those protocols that are
based upon zero-knowledge proofs where the claimant can prove their identity to another
entity in real-time without revealing any meaningful information other than the claim of
being that particular entity.
We touched briefly on modern day applications of these identification protocols. As the
Internet grows and becomes an essential part of our lives, e-commerce has grown and with it
the need for entities to identify themselves by revealing more and more sensitive information
about themselves. The Internet provides a vast array of ways in which people's privacy can be
and is being intruded upon, and adds new dimensions to existing problems. It necessitates the
negotiation of a whole new set of balances among the various interests. Identification
protocols that can prove an entity’s identity without the need for that entity to reveal any
information about itself are to be welcomed. As a result, we anticipate that identification
protocols will grow in importance as we seek new ways to negotiate the conflicting needs of
privacy on the one hand and proving our identity on the other.
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